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Abstract. 
In economics, there is currently an important discussion on the role of "legal origins" or 
"legal families". Some economists claim that legal origins play a crucial role until 
today. Usually, they distinguish between Common Law, French, Scandinavian and 
German legal origin. When these legal origins are compared, countries belonging to the 
Common Law tradition regularly come out best (with regard to many different 
dimensions) and countries belonging to the French legal origin worst. 
International arbitration provides an ideal "natural experiment" to test this view 
empirically: in international trade, the contracting parties are free to choose the 
substantive law that suits their interests best. If the literature just cited was correct, we 
would expect that rational traders would structure their interactions according to some 
substantive law based on the Common Law tradition such as British or US American 
law. Although exact statistics are not readily available, the evidence from cases that end 
up with international arbitration courts (such as the International Court of Arbitration 
run by the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris) clearly demonstrates that this 
is not the case. 
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Are International Merchants Stupid? - A Natural Experiment Refutes the Legal 
Origin Theory 
I. Introduction 
The conjecture that the legal origins of a country determine the quality of its 
government until today has spread like an epidemic in economics. Although the debate 
concerning the relative merits of common vs. civil law has been going on for decades 
and legal comparativists have traditionally distinguished between a number of legal 
systems or legal families, the literature got a real boost with a number of papers 
authored by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV for short) in the 
late 90ies (1997, 1998, 1999).1 Indeed, LLSV has become somewhat of a brand name 
by now. The number of citations is indeed stunning: on April 22, 2005, the academic 
search engine “scholar.google.com” contained 1105 electronically available papers that 
had cited the 1997 paper. The 1998 paper was cited 1483 times, and the 1999 paper still 
a very noteworthy 447 times. The numbers are truly stunning. For comparison, Coase’s 
(1960) paper on social cost, often considered the most cited economic paper of all times, 
got 1916 quotes. 
Distinguishing between common law, socialist law and three different civil law families 
(French, German, Scandinavian), the authors find (1999, 261) that  
“Compared to common law countries, French origin countries are sharply 
more interventionist (have higher tax rates, less secure property rights and 
worse regulation). They also have less efficient governments, as measured 
by bureaucratic delays and tax compliance, though not the corruption score. 
French origin countries pay relatively higher wages to bureaucrats than 
common law countries do, though this does not buy them greater 
government efficiency. French origin countries fall behind common law 
countries in public good provision: they have higher infant mortality, lower 
school attainment, higher illiteracy rates, and lower infrastructure quality…. 
As predicted by the political theory then, the state-building intent 
incorporated into the design of the French legal system translates, many 
decades later, into significantly more interventionist and less efficient 
government, less political freedom, and evidently less provision of basic 
public goods.” 
Hence, the results are at least as stunning as the number of citations. The classification 
into one of the legal origins is done based on the private law of a country, i.e. on the law 
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that orders the horizontal relationships between actors – and not their relationship to the 
state. But most of the effects dealt with in the citation have to do with aspects of public 
law, as, e.g., tax rates or regulation. Implicitly, LLSV thus argue that private law 
dominates public law. 
This paper uses a very simple natural experiment to test some aspects of this claim 
empirically. In international trade, the contracting parties are free to choose the 
substantive law that suits their interests best. We assume that rational traders are 
interested in the best possible ex ante protection of their property rights. If French law 
does not adequately protect private property rights, we would not expect international 
traders to choose it as their substantive law. Correspondingly, if Common law offers 
them a better basis to conduct business, we would expect them to choose one 
substantive law out of this legal family to structure their interactions. The international 
associations that offer arbitration services are reluctant to publish many data concerning 
these questions. Yet, the little available empirical evidence is sufficient to refute the 
hypothesis that follows from the legal origin discussion. French, but also Swiss law, are 
chosen more frequently than could be expected. American law is chosen less frequently 
than expected. With regard to international arbitration, there is thus reason to argue that 
legal origins are largely irrelevant. On the basis of the little available data, an even 
stronger claim can be made: if merchants choose the substantive law that suits their 
interests best and U.S. American law is chosen less frequently than French or Swiss 
law, this indicates that U.S. law is less efficient than its competitors. 
The paper is organized as follows: section two describes the legal origin hypothesis in a 
little more detail, spells out some of the underlying assumptions as well as the 
implications and criticizes some aspects of the argument. Section three presents some of 
the relevant institutions and organizations used by international merchants to structure 
their interactions and contains the description of the natural experiment analyzing the 
choice of substantive law by international merchants. Section four contains a discussion 
of the results. Section five concludes.   3
II. The Legal-Origin Hypothesis: Assumptions, Effects, Implications, Critique 
The two most important findings of the legal origin discussion as presented by LLSV 
seem to be that (1) the legal past of a country determines the present quality of its 
government and that (2) the characteristics of its private law are a better proxy for the 
present government quality than proxies much closer to public law such as form of 
government, electoral systems, degree of separation of powers, independence of the 
judiciary etc. This section serves to present their argument in greater detail, to spell out 
some of the assumptions and implications, but also to criticize their argument. 
In their paper on the quality of government, LLSV (1999) basically distinguish between 
three law families, namely socialist, common and civil law. That socialist law tends to 
be correlated with an interventionist and grossly inefficient state is in line with our 
intuitions. What is more interesting is the difference between common and civil law 
families. It is often argued that in civil law countries, it is parliamentarians that can 
“make” law, whereas in common law countries, it is the judges who “find” it. An 
important role is ascribed to precedence or stare decisis in common law countries. The 
debate is, of course, not particularly novel. In the 60s, Hayek (1960) and Leoni 
(1961/1991) argued that common law would be superior to civil law because the latter 
can be radically changed overnight, whereas the former would be more stable. This 
would, in turn, allow private actors to form long-term expectations and to act on them, 
that is make long-term investments which should, c.p., generate higher growth rates in 
common law countries.2 In the 70s, it was argued (Rubin 1977, Priest 1977) that 
common law was more efficient because parties that could deal with resources more 
efficiently would resort to the courts until precedent was changed to the more efficient 
allocation of resources. 
Legal scholars seem to agree that the difference between the two families is often 
largely exaggerated. Posner (2002, 38), for example, describes the two traditions as 
„convergent“ (for a similar evaluation, see, for example, Zweigert and Kötz 1996). 
Although factual differences between the two families seem to be disappearing, LLSV’s 
                                                 
2 Napoleon, on the other hand, intended to create a Code Civil which was to remain unchanged 
infinitely. If government is able to credibly commit on this, the probability for change should be 
correspondingly low. It would be an interesting empirical topic to quantify legislative activity in 
various countries and to check whether it is higher in common law or in civil law countries.   4
results are often very significant. Yet, LLSV dig a bit deeper with regard to civil law 
origins because they distinguish between French, German and Scandinavian families. 
We have already cited the results concerning French law. With regard to German legal 
origin, LLSV (1999, 262) find that “these countries are rather similar to those of 
common law origin”. With regard to Scandinavian legal origin, they find that they are 
sharply more interventionist though not less efficient. These results are interesting – and 
potentially undermining LLSV’s more general argument: If the general distinction is 
between common and civil law and the more fine-grained one within the civil law 
family, then one would expect all members of the civil law family to do worse – or 
better – than the other families. That two out of three members of the civil law family 
do just as well as common law might be an argument in favor of the more fine-grained 
distinction but lets the more general distinction between common and civil law appear 
questionable. 
Let us now turn to some of the implications of the LLSV view of legal origins: First of 
all, they must assume that legal transplants are possible, no matter whether 
transplantation is by conquest, colonization or voluntary adoption. Former British 
colonies are almost always coded “English” legal origin3, former French, Spanish, 
Portuguese, and Belgian colonies always “French” (except where they are Socialist as 
Vietnam, e.g.). This coding appears plausible, but questions arise nevertheless: If the 
effects of legal systems are “very long term”, should the countries not be coded 
according to their pre-colonial system? And if the very long term effects are so 
important, why not code some of the formerly socialist countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe as German instead of socialist? 
Another problem of LLSV is that they do not sufficiently distinguish between legal 
origin and a country having been a colony. The former British and French colonies 
obviously play an important role in the results. However, having been a British or 
French colony and having a British or French private law system is not necessarily the 
same thing. It is, at least theoretically, conceivable that a country has adopted French 
law without ever having been a French colony. As Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2004) 
have recently found: „French colonial origin is associated with less corruption, 
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legal origin seem to be the only two exceptions.   5
counteracting the positive effect on corruption of having a French legal system.“ 
Corruption is, of course, only one of the many aspects dealt with by LLSV. Yet, Persson 
et al. argue that it made a difference if a country only has a French legal system or if it 
was – in addition – a French colony. If the French exported their implementation know-
how, at least one variable of interest seems to have had offsetting effects. Joireman 
(2004) recently found that a sample including all common law countries does not score 
significantly better than countries of other legal origins with regard to the rule of law. 
This was only the case if the sample was reduced to former colonies. This is, thus, 
another study confirming the relevance of having been a colony. A more fine-grained 
mapping (legal origin? Colonial history?) might thus be in order. 
Furthermore, it might be the case that LLSV did not sufficiently take into account the 
differences between the British and the French as colonial powers. Zweigert and Kötz 
(1996) assert that the British did not try to replace Islamic, Hindu or unwritten African 
law. In India, the English courts were instructed to apply Islamic or Hindu law 
depending on the religion of the parties in cases of inheritance, marriage, caste and so 
on. In Africa, judges were to apply English law only to the extent that local 
circumstances permitted. The British thus did not insist on the material content of their 
law but did export the procedures, which enabled the emergence of a variety of common 
laws after the colonies had become independent. 
The French, in contrast, strove to “improve” men in the colonies and lift them up to 
French standards of civilization (ibid.). They thus attempted to implement the material 
content of the Code Civil in all their colonies, even if there were serious conflicts 
between it and, say, Islamic laws. It could thus be argued that it was not French or Civil 
law, per se, that was inapt to induce economic growth and development, but the attempt 
of the French to implement the material content of their law even against resistance 
whereas the English refrained from such attempts.4 Whereas the French (tried to) export 
material law, the English confined themselves to the export of procedural law, which 
could be “filled up” according to local custom and tradition. This would, then, indicate 
that the French approach was much more likely to create conflicting property rights 
systems than the British approach. In other words: successfully transplanting procedural 
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whereas the common law is “good”.   6
law seems to be much easier than successfully transplanting material law. Although we 
have identified some flaws in the approach of LLSV, it has nevertheless enabled us to 
produce a hypothesis, namely that the French attempt to implement their material law 
has had far-reaching effect on the quality of government that remain significant to this 
day. 
One could also argue that it is not origin that counts but the way in which law is 
transplanted. This hypothesis has been promoted by Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard 
(2002). They argue that the way the law was initially transplanted and received is a 
more important determinant than the affiliation to a particular legal family. They claim 
that the origin of a legal system as identified by LLSV (1998, 1999) might be a good 
predictor for what I would call de jure legality, but not for the factual implementation of 
the law. For de facto legality, the way the law was transformed according to the specific 
situation of a society, whether it was imported voluntarily or enforced by a colonial 
power and so forth would be much more important. According to their findings, 
countries that have developed legal orders internally or adapted transplanted legal 
orders to local conditions and (or) had a population that was already familiar with basic 
legal principles of the transplanted law have more effective legality than countries that 
received foreign law without any similar pre-dispositions. 
Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) have endogenized the choice of legal systems. Comparing 
England with France, they argue that the different structural characteristics of both 
systems could have been adapted to the different environment, both choices might thus 
have been efficient. One environmental condition gets special attention, namely the 
amount of bullying observed in a country. They (2002) write: “In contrast, the 
transplantation of rules designed for a system with little bullying into a system with a 
greater amount can lead to the breakdown of the rule of law.” The French system is 
better suited for countries with a high amount of “bullying” than the English system. 
Given that “bullying” was higher in the former colonies, would this not imply that the 
transplantation of French law is better able to protect the rule of law than English law? 
But is this implication not entirely at odds with LLSV? 
There is an extensive law and economics literature on the characteristics of efficient 
private law. Most generally, private law is efficient if it enables the actors to execute 
wealth-creating transactions at low cost and if non-compensated externalities between   7
actors are absent. Additionally, liability should be with the least-cost avoider etc. But no 
matter how efficient the private law is, it will only be enhancing economic development 
if it is backed up by an adequate public law. Private law is thus a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for economic development. The promise of a government to respect 
and enforce private property rights will only be credible if adequate public law 
organizations are available. The police, the procuracy, the courts are all based on public 
law. 
LLSV obtain their results based on one particular area of private law, namely corporate 
law, yet their results seem to carry over to the quality of government, which is based on 
public law. Their implicit hypothesis must thus be that private law is clearly more 
important than public law, constitutional law included. Differences in government 
performance are explained by differences in private law. 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) plead for an “unbundling” of institutions in order to 
determine their effects on economic outcomes one by one. They distinguish between 
property rights institutions (PRI) and contracting institutions (CI). Whereas the former 
protect property owners from government infringement into their rights, the latter order 
the interactions between private actors. This distinction neatly corresponds with ours: 
PRI is part of public law, whereas CI is part of private law. Their basic hypothesis is 
that inadequate PRI are a lot worse for the development prospects of an economy than 
inadequate CI: if the private law of a country is not in accordance with the needs of 
traders and merchants, they can always – albeit at a price – circumvent using the CI 
supplied by the state. If the public law of a country is, however, not conducive to the 
protection of property rights, there is no way to circumvent its application (except for 
leaving the respective jurisdiction which will, however, reduce its growth prospects 
even further). The hypothesis thus runs directly against the LLSV hypothesis; whereas 
they argue that private law is more important than public law, Acemoglu and Johnson 
argue the exact opposite. Acemoglu and Johnson test their claim empirically, using 
“procedural formalism” as a proxy for the quality of CI. Drawing on seven different 
criteria such as written as opposed to oral litigation, the number of steps in court 
proceedings etc., Djankov et al. (2003) show that procedural formalism is highly 
correlated with legal origins. Acemoglu and Johnson use this indicator and find that “… 
once we control for the effects of property rights institutions, legal formalism seems to   8
have no impact on income per capita, the investment to GDP ratio, and the private credit 
GDP ratio.” 
To sum up: although their results are quite impressive, the story told by LLSV suffers a 
number of shortcomings. The coding of some countries appears questionable, possible 
interdependencies between legal origins and former colonies are not explicitly dealt 
with and the implicit assumption that private law is more important than public law for 
a country’s development seems to be refuted by the evidence provided by others. 
 
III. A Natural Experiment 
We now turn to a natural experiment that can serve as another empirical test concerning 
the validity of the LLSV view of the world. If civil law, and in particular French law, is 
clearly inferior to common law, then rational actors who have the possibility to opt out 
of French law – and into a more efficient legal system – should be expected to do so. 
Whether they actually do so will be analyzed in this section. Before getting to the 
numbers, some of the institutional prerequisites of international trade will be very 
shortly described. 
There are a number of reasons why non-state court arbitration is so frequently preferred 
over state court arbitration in international contracts: 
(1)  When private law subjects from different jurisdictions negotiate the details of 
a contract, they are often afraid of the so-called “home bias” of state courts, 
i.e. the tendency of state courts to decide in favor of the party originating from 
their jurisdiction. 
(2)  Many states are reluctant to enforce the decisions of courts of other states as 
this is perceived as an undue acceptance of other legal systems and would 
involve an – unwanted – abdication of one’s own sovereignty. But all states 
that have ratified the New York Convention have pledged to enforce decisions 
made by non-state courts. Ex ante, enforcement is thus more likely if non-
state court arbitration is chosen. 
(3)  Passed a certain threshold concerning the monetary claims involved, non-state 
arbitration is cheaper with regard to out-of-pocket costs.   9
(4)  The sequence of courts is often reduced to one in non-state arbitration, which 
means that the judicial decisions are reached a lot faster than in state courts. 
This increases certainty, which is highly valued by businesspeople. 
(5)  In private arbitration, the judges do not necessarily have a legal background 
but can be engineers, physicists etc. Many businesspeople believe that it is an 
advantage to have “issue experts” judging their case. 
All these reasons explain why such a large majority of international contracts (between 
80 and 95%) do not rely on state courts at all, but on non-state arbitration that is often 
administered by specialized organizations such as international chambers of commerce. 
Opting out of state court administered jurisdiction does, however, not imply to opt out 
of substantive state law. Although it is theoretically possible to do so and to refer, e.g., 
to the lex mercatoria, more than 80% of those international contracts that contain a 
choice-of-law clause are concluded on the basis of the substantive law of a state 
(International Court of Arbitration 2004).5 By now, it is well-known that all contracts 
are by necessity incomplete, i.e. it is impossible to anticipate all possible contingencies 
completely and to specify the legal consequences accordingly. In case a situation arises 
that has not been dealt with in the contract, the chosen substantive law becomes 
relevant: it serves as a subsidiary law that is to “fill the gap” left in the contract. Derains 
(1995, 10) claims that it is “not possible to overemphasize the importance of the law 
applicable to the contract.” The question then is: what factors determine its choice? 
From an economic point of view, one would expect each of the contracting parties to 
propose that law to its contracting partner that promises the highest expected benefits to 
itself. Aspects that possibly play in here include 
(1) the  familiarity  with a private law system. A high degree of familiarity 
involves a low degree of additional transaction costs that have to be incurred. 
(2) the  predictability of decisions made by arbitrators based on the respective 
law. The predictability, in turn, depends on the precision of the relevant laws; 
predictability is, of course, closely related with certainty whose relevance has 
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2003 contained a choice-of-law clause specifying the applicable law. In 80.4% of these cases, 
the parties opted for a national law.   10
already been mentioned above. Predictability further depends on the stability 
of the relevant law. 
(3) the  perceived fairness of the relevant laws. Ex ante, parties do not know 
whether they will ever be plaintiffs or defendants, which means that they have 
incentives to consent on a law that does not unduly favor one of the parties. 
Due to (1), we expect that most contracting parties propose the law of their own country 
as the law applicable to the contract. If there is a power asymmetry between the parties, 
we can thus expect that the substantive law of the more powerful country will be chosen 
as the applicable law. If there is no power asymmetry, it seems reasonable to expect that 
the contracting parties will agree on some law of a third state that satisfies 
considerations (2) and (3). 
Comparing legal systems with regard to (2), it could be that common law systems have 
a systematic disadvantage here because the law is “discovered” by judges, implying that 
it is not sufficient to know legislation in order to know the currently valid law, but also 
many court decisions. This can cause two different types of costs, namely (i) higher 
transaction costs in ascertaining the currently valid law and/or (ii) higher transaction 
costs in trying to spell out as many contingencies as possible in the contract which 
makes contracts more complex, lengthier etc. 
If a substantive law is subject to the danger of heavy government intrusion into private 
property rights, then this substantive law will not be chosen by international business 
representatives, simply because it would reduce predictability. According to LLSV, the 
protection of private property rights in legal systems belonging to the French legal 
family is very low. At the margin, this lacking protection could be so severe that it 
dominates all other criteria implying that even firms that are familiar with the system 
would prefer to opt out of it into a system that they know less well. This hypothesis 
could be termed “LLSV extreme”. It would imply that no international contracts should 
be based on French law because even French firms – or more generally: firms from 
countries belonging to the French legal tradition – prefer to opt into other substantive 
laws. They thus expect that the higher transactions costs they need to incur due to their 
lower familiarity with other legal systems will be more than offset by the expected 
efficiency gains.   11
But LLSV do not need to imply this “corner solution.” It could be that some firms based 
in countries belonging to the French legal origin would prefer to stick to their legal 
origins whereas others would prefer to opt out. The number of contracts according to 
which French law is chosen as the applicable law then needs to be compared to the 
number of contracts one would expect to observe given that all parties strive to conclude 
contracts according to their own law. This hypothesis will be dubbed “LLSV light”. 
Additional considerations that could have an impact on the choice of law are (1) the 
home-base of internationally active law firms. Our hunch here is that Anglo-American 
law firms are more important than the share of internationally traded goods and services 
from those countries would let one expect. This could be an advantage for the English 
law origin as we expect lawyers to advise their clients to choose a law with which the 
lawyers – and not the clients themselves – are familiar. 
How to test these hypotheses empirically? There are a number of associations that have 
specialized in providing arbitration services to internationally active firms. We 
contacted quite a few of them asking for case statistics, and in particular for the chosen 
substantive legal systems. The answers were disappointing: Most of the organizations 
replied that they do not produce such statistics and that they were not able to produce 
them expressly for us. Table 1 gives an impression of the number of cases that these 
various organizations have received over the last dozen years. 
     12
Table 1: The Case Load of International Arbitration Courts 
   1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004
AAA  204 207 187 180 226 320 387 453 510 649 672 N/A N/A 
CIETAC  267  486  829  902  778  723  645  609  543  731* 684* 709*  850*
HKIAC  185 139 150 184 197 218 240 257 298 307 320 287**280 
ICC  337  352  384  427  433  452  466  529  541  566* 593* 580*  561*
JCAA  5 3 4 7 8 13  14  12  10  17  9 14  21 
KCAB  30  28  33  18  36  51  59  40  40  65  47  38  46 
KUALA 
LUMPUR  4 3 8 12  6 8 15  19  12  4 N/A  N/A  N/A 
LCIA*  21  29  39  49  37  52  70  56  81  71  88  104  87 
SIAC  7  15 22 37 25 43 67 67 55 56 46 41  51 
STOCKHOLM  44  78  74  70  75  82  92  104  73  74  55  82  N/A 
VANCOUVER* 44 52 54 40 57 41 49 60 88 88 71 76  84 
VIENNA+  47  48  64  44  45  47  46  37  55  55  49  45  50 
 
AAA - American Arbitration Association; CIETAC - China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission; HKIAC - Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre; ICC - International 
Chamber of Commerce; JCAA - Japan Commercial Arbitration Association; KCAB - The Korean 
Commercial Arbitration Board; Kuala Lumpur - Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration; LCIA - 
London Court of International Arbitration; SIAC - Singapore International Arbitration Centre; Stockholm 
- Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce; Vancouver - British Columbia 
International Commercial Arbitration Centre; Vienna - International Arbitral Centre of the Austrian 
Federal Economic Chamber. 
* The statistics include domestic as well as international arbitrations;** As a result of Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome, the caseload for 2003 was down compared to 2002; N/A - not available; + cases 
completed. 
Sources: Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre at http://www.hkiac.org/en_statistics.html and own 
modifications. 
 
The only organization that provided at least some additional data was the International 
Chamber of Commerce in Paris which runs the International Court of Arbitration. This 
is why we present this court in a little more detail. Information is based on the Statistical   13
Report of the Court for the year 2003. The Court will only deal with conflicts that have 
an international and commercial background. In 2003, the Court had 114 members from 
78 countries and met on 60 occasions, 12 times in plenary session and 48 times as a 
committee. Decisions on single cases are, however, not prepared by the court but by 
arbitrators. As the table already indicates, 580 cases were filed in 2003. 1584 parties 
were involved in these cases (implying that there were quite a few multiparty cases). 
Those parties came from 123 different countries, the highest number of parties coming 
from the U.S. and Canada (220). Next in line were France (127), Germany (112), Italy 
(92) and the U.K. (71). 
Choosing the International Court of Arbitration is not equivalent to choosing Paris as a 
place of arbitration. In 2003, cases were heard in 47 different countries, the most 
frequently selected cities being Paris (112 cases), London (48 cases), Geneva (38 cases), 
New York (33 cases) and Zurich (26 cases). 82% of the contracts underlying the 
disputes referred to the ICA in 2003 contained a choice-of-law clause specifying the 
applicable law. In 80.4% of the contracts, the parties opted for a national law. The 
amounts in dispute ranged between less than 50 000 US dollars to more than one 
billion. Almost 35% of the cases involved amounts between 1 and 10 million US 
dollars. 
According to the Statistics for 2003, “the laws of England, Switzerland and France” 
were the most commonly chosen ones. The Documentation & Research Department of 
the ICC informed me that this still held true in 2004. The percentage points are 24% for 
England, 20% for Switzerland and 19% for France whereas U.S. American and    14
Canadian Law was only chosen 10% of the time.6 LLSV code Swiss law as German 
legal origin. The Swiss Civil Code was indeed written by legal scholars from the 
German part of Switzerland who had been trained in Germany (Zweigert/Kötz 1996, 
165ff.). Yet, subsequent to the French revolution, French influence had been 
considerable particularly in the Western and Southern cantons of the country. The Code 
Civil was valid in the cantons of Geneva and Berner Jura because they belonged to the 
French Republic. Even after the two cantons joined the Swiss confederation in 1815, the 
Code Civil remained valid there. When many of the cantons passed their own civil 
codes during the 19
th century, the French Code Civil served as a model in many French 
speaking cantons such as Vaud, Fribourg, Valais and Neuchâtel, but also in Italian 
speaking Ticino (ibid., 102). Even though most observers seem to agree in classifying 
Switzerland as belonging to German legal origin, there is no doubt that French influence 
is not negligible. 
Clearly, the numbers just cited are not in accordance with “LLSV extreme”. But how 
about “LLSV light”? In order to know we need a reference number of cases that we can 
compare these numbers with. A rather straightforward benchmark could look like this: 
every party to a contract will try to make its “home law” the law applicable to the 
contract. It was conjectured that the more powerful party could have an advantage here. 
Since we do not know anything about the relative powers of contracting parties, a 
reasonable assumption seems to be that all contracting parties have an equal chance of 
making the other party agree to its home law. Taking multiparty cases into account, the 
number of cases is then not divided by 2 (which we would do if all cases were two-party 
                                                 
6 The U.S. and Canada are reported in conjunction here because the numbers provided by the 
ICC are only available for both countries together. As we are interested in the choice of 
common law vs. civil law jurisdictions, this does not constitute a major problem as Canada 
belongs to the common law tradition (with the exception of Quebec). 
  In a study confined to the analysis of international distribution contracts, Corinne Truong 
(2001) finds choices of substantive laws that seem broadly in line with the more general figures 
provided here. She finds that civil law is chosen much more frequently than common law which 
might, however, be due to the fact that distribution was usually carried out in Europe. The rank 
order of the most attractive civil laws is French, Swiss, German, Italian, Spanish, Belgian, 
Dutch, Danish and Swedish. Note that Italian, Spanish, Belgian and Dutch laws are part of the 
French tradition. 
  On a more informal level, the secretary of the Vienna-based International Arbitral Centre 
of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber has confirmed that more than half of the cases 
decided there use Austrian, German or Swiss substantive law.   15
cases), but by 2.73 in order to arrive at a benchmark. This number is the result of the 
division of 1584 (the number of parties engaged in ICC disputes in 2003) by 580 (the 
number of cases). 
The statistical report of the ICC contains the number of parties ordered according to 
geographic origin. We thus know how many parties came from the four jurisdictions 
mentioned above and can divide the number by 2.73. The result is our benchmark, i.e. 
the number of cases that we would expect to be conducted under a substantive law of a 
nation-state given that no other factors, such as predictability, certainty or anything else 
play in. 
Unfortunately, our information concerning the use of substantial law is highly restricted. 
We only know this number as a percentage for England, France, Switzerland and the 
US and Canada. This is why the benchmark is only calculated for these four 
jurisdictions. The comparison between the benchmark and the factually observed 
number of cases enables us to calculate a coefficient. Values of larger than one indicate 
that the substantive law of a country is chosen more often than was to be expected 











number of cases 
Coefficient
England 71  26  24  139 5.35 
Switzerland 52  19  20  116 6.11 
France 127  47  19  110 2.34 
U.S./Canada 220  81  10  58 0.72 
Sources: ICC 2003 Statistical Report, private communication, own calculations. For calculating the 
implied number of absolute cases, the entire case-load of the ICC (i.e. 580 cases) was taken as the base. 
On the other hand, only some 64% of all cases contain an explicit choice of national substantive law. 
Thus, we could also have calculated the numbers on the basis of 383 cases (i.e. 64%). It is, however, 
unclear what the numbers communicated by the ICC refer to. More importantly, changing the base does 
not change the quality of the results at all. 
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The results seem to indicate that Swiss law is most attractive, followed by English law, 
i.e. a law belonging to the common law family. If “LLSV light” were right, we would 
expect French law to receive a coefficient of smaller one which is not the case. What is 
even more astonishing is that U.S. law appears to be highly unattractive. Its coefficient 
is by far the smallest among the countries for which data are available. What is more, its 
coefficient is clearly below one, indicating that North American firms are opting out of 
their substantive law. 
 
IV. Discussion of the Results 
Of course, these results should be treated with caution: we only have data from one 
single arbitration court and we only have data for a very limited number of countries. 
Yet, the Document & Research Department of the ICC has confirmed that the year 2003 
was not a year that was particularly disadvantageous to the U.S.. If anything, it was 
favorable to the U.S., as in 2002, only 7.7% of all cases dealt with by the ICC used U.S. 
law as substantive law; this would, c.p., mean that the U.S. coefficient would have been 
0.55 instead of 0.72. 
Based on this natural experiment, we can thus conclude that LLSV extreme is clearly 
refuted by the available data. LLSV light is not confirmed by the available data either. 
Although English law was chosen more frequently than expected according to our 
benchmark, this was also the case for French as well as for Swiss law, with Swiss law 
being the most attractive although it has been heavily influenced by French law as 
discussed above. The data further seem to indicate that U.S. American law is perceived 
as unattractive by international businesspeople. The data are corroborated by anecdotal 
evidence according to which U.S. law is often perceived as bizarre. 
It is noteworthy, however, that the performance of common law countries is pointing at 
different directions: whereas English law is chosen a lot more frequently than expected, 
U.S. American law is chosen a lot less frequently than expected. It would be interesting 
to know whether U.S. firms use this as a bargaining chip, i.e. agree on English law after 
it has become clear that their partners are not willing to consent on the use of U.S. 
American law.   17
Switzerland is clearly over-represented which might also be due to the construction of 
the benchmark. In its construction, it was assumed that the substantive law chosen is 
always the home law of one of the contracting parties. Yet, our theoretical 
considerations have led us to hypothesize that in cases of approximately equal strength 
of the contracting parties, they might just as well choose the substantive law of a third 
country. Here, Switzerland clearly has the advantage of being small: due to its small 
population, the likelihood that one of the contracting parties is Swiss is lower than, say, 
the likelihood of finding a British, German or American at the negotiating table which 
means that Swiss law has a higher a priori likelihood of being chosen if negotiations get 
to this stage. On the other hand, laws of countries with a similar population size such as 
Austria are selected less frequently.7 One reason for this could be that the Swiss are able 
to work in a number of different languages and that law commentaries etc. are available 
in at least four languages (namely German, French, English and Italian). 
One possible counterargument with regard to the figures could be that it is small wonder 
that French law was chosen so often given that the seat of the organization providing for 
arbitration services was Paris. For two reasons, this counterargument is, however, not 
convincing: (1) the choice of location and the choice of substantive law are not only 
uncorrelated on logical and judicial grounds, but also seem to be factually uncorrelated 
(Corinne Truong 2001). (2) The choice of Paris as the location of the arbitration 
organization indicates that the set of rules and procedures applied there seem to be what 
many arbitrators prefer over other organizations at other locations that could, in 
principle, also be chosen. 
 
                                                 
7 Additionally, both countries have traditionally been neutral.   18
V. Conclusions and Outlook 
The hypothesis that countries with common law origins have a number of advantages 
concerning the quality of their government vis-à-vis countries with civil law origins was 
shortly presented and critically discussed. It was argued that if the common law is 
indeed better suited to structure business transactions, businesspeople would, if given 
the choice, prefer to conduct their transactions under substantive law of the common 
law family rather than of the civil law family. In international transactions, business 
people have precisely this choice. The choice factually used by them thus constitutes a 
natural experiment to test the hypothesis concerning all the claimed advantages of the 
common law. 
The results presented here are based on cases conducted under the auspices of the 
International Court of Arbitration. They show that French law, which is regularly 
supposed to be the worst branch within the civil law family, is frequently chosen, just as 
is Swiss law that has been substantially influenced by French law. Moreover, U.S. 
American law is chosen less frequently than expected according to the benchmark here 
constructed. 
These results can, however, only be preliminary. For future studies, broader datasets 
covering more countries, more arbitration organizations and longer time-periods are 
desirable. In addition, some additional variables could be of interest: it could, e.g., be 
the case that the average contract length has substantially increased over time which 
could be interpreted as an attempt of the contracting partners (or their attorneys) to 
reduce the number of contingencies and thus to reduce the likelihood of ever having to 
resort to a state-created substantive law. This would, of course, mean that the relevance 
of the choice of law has decreased over time. 
On a broader scale, it is noteworthy that LLSV never tested the significance of legal 
origins for explaining variation in income and growth. Our own tests in conjunction 
with judicial independence (Feld and Voigt 2003, 2004) showed that only socialist legal 
origins have a significant (negative) impact on growth rates. This points towards the 
necessity to “unbundle institutions” as proposed by Acemoglu and Johnson (2003). It 
appears plausible that differences in public law are a lot more relevant than differences 




Acemoglu, D. and S. Johnson (2003); Unbundling Institutions, mimeo MIT. 
Berkowitz, D., K. Pistor and J.-F. Richard (2002); ‘Economic Development, Legality, 
and the Transplant Effect’, European Economic Review, 47(1):165-95. 
Coase, R. (1960), ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1-
44. 
Corinne Truong, C.Q. (2001), The Law Applicable to the Merits in International 
Distribution Contracts: An Analysis of ICC Arbitral Awards, ICC International 
Court of Arbitration Bulletin 12(1):37-47. 
Derains, Y. (1995), The ICC Arbitral Process Part VIII. Choice of the Law Applicable 
to the Contract and International Arbitration, ICC International Court of 
Arbitration Bulletin 6(1):10-18. 
Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer (2003), Courts: The Lex 
Mundi Project, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2):453-517. 
Feld, L. und S. Voigt (2003); Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross 
Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators,  European Journal of Political 
Economy 19(3):497-527. 
Feld, L. and S. Voigt (2004); “Making Judges Independent - Some Proposals Regarding 
the Judiciary”. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1260. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=597721 
Glaeser, E. and A. Shleifer (2001), Legal Origins. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
117(4):1193-1229. 
Hayek, F. (1960), The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
International Court of Arbitration (2004); 2003 Statistical Report, ICC International 
Court of Arbitration Bulletin 15(1):7-16.   20
Joireman, S. (2004); Colonization and the Rule of Law: Comparing the Effectiveness of 
Common Law and Civil Law Countries. Constitutional Political Economy 
15:315-38. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. und Vishny, R. (1997), ‘Legal 
Determinants of External Finance’, Journal of Finance, 52(3):1131-50. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (1998), ‘Law and Finance’, Journal 
of Political Economy, 106(6):1113-55. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. und Vishny, R. (1999), ‘The Quality of 
Government’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,15(1):222-79. 
Leoni, B. (1991), Freedom and the Law, Expanded Third Edition, Foreworded by 
Arthur Kemp, Indianopolis: Liberty Fund. 
Mahoney, P. (2001), ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be 
Right’, Journal of Legal Studies 30:503-25. 
Persson, T., G. Tabellini and F. Trebbi (2004), ‘Electoral Rules and Corruption’; 
Journal of the European Economic Association 1:***-***. 
Posner, R. (2002), ‘Lecture 2: Formal Versus Substantive Economic Theories of Law’, 
in: R. Posner: Law, Economics, and Democracy – Three Lectures in Greece, 
Athens: Sakkoulas Publishers, 29 –46. 
Priest, G. (1977), ‘The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules’, 
Journal of Legal Studies, 6:65-82. 
Rubin, P. (1977), ‘Why is the Common Law Efficient?’, Journal of Legal Studies, 6:51-
63. 
Zweigert, K. and H. Kötz (1996), Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung, Tübingen: 
Mohr (Siebeck)
3. 